We show that either of the following hypotheses imply that there is an inner model with a proper class of strong cardinals and a proper class of Woodin cardinals. 1) There is a countably closed cardinal k ≥ N₃ such that □k and □(k) fail. 2) There is a cardinal k such that k is weakly compact in the generic extension by Col(k, k⁺). Of special interest is 1) with k = N₃ since it follows from PFA by theorems of (...) Todorcevic and Velickovic. Our main new technical result, which is due to the first author, is a weak covering theorem for the model obtained by stacking mice over $K^c ||k.$. (shrink)

In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ronald Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the (...) naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism: it establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies. (shrink)

In his role as Editor-in-Chief of EPAT, and with characteristic generosity, Michael Peters has invited me to offer an editorial on the occasion of the publication of my latest book, ‘The Philosophy...

The overarching issue addressed in Catia Faria’s Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature is ‘the problem of wild animal suffering in nature: Ought we to prevent,...

Reviewing the first twenty years of publication of the "Journal of Religious Ethics", the author examines the journal's pattern of growth, its niche in the array of scholarly journals, and its prospects. The author argues that JRE coincided with and stimulated the emergence of religious ethics as an independent scholarly field. He notes that it has been a valuable resource for philosophical analyses of religious ethics, has virtually created the field of comparative religious ethics, and has provided considerable impetus for (...) historical research. On the negative side, JRE has not done as well as it might in bringing political theorists, psychologists, sociologists, and interpreters of the aesthetic into the dialogue with religious ethicists, nor has it succeeded as well as was hoped in overcoming its Christian and Western bias. (shrink)

Admiration and adoration have been considered as emotions with the power to change people, yet our knowledge of the specific nature and function of these emotions is quite limited. From an interdisciplinary perspective, we present a prototype approach to admiration and what has variously been labelled adoration, worship, or reverence. Both admiration and adoration contribute to the formation of personal and collective ideals, values, and identities, but their workings differ. We offer a detailed theoretical account of commonalities and differences in (...) the appraisal patterns and action tendencies associated with the two emotions. This analysis reveals that admiration motivates the internalisation and emulation of ideals embodied by an outstanding role model. Adoration motivates adherence to the teachings and expectations of a meaning maker and benefactor perceived as superhuman or sacred. Thus, the primary function of admiration is to promote individual learning and change, whereas adoration primarily serves to bind communities together. (shrink)

Among philosophers, Don Campbell is best known for his naturalistic, evolutionary approach to epistemology. There can be no doubt, however, that he was a thoroughgoing naturalist in all matters, even though he seems to have had little interest in exploring naturalism as a general philosophical position. He was professionally more interested in the origins and workings of knowledge producing social systems. I am interested in these things too, but also naturalism in general. So my tribute to Don will be to (...) present some aspects of a generalized naturalism that I hope he would have liked. Campbell's naturalism, like his epistemology, would be evolutionary, but, like his realism, would be more. It would be hypothetical, a posit, and not a first principle. And it would be critical, subject to ongoing refinement in light of new experience. Thus my title. It is a title I fancy Don would have liked, perhaps one he himself would have used had he ever taken up naturalism as a general theme. It is much easier to give a negative characterization of naturalism than to provide a positive account of what it.. (shrink)

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: Let M be a premouse with a top extender, F. Suppose that (a) M is linearly coarsely iterable via hitting F and its images, and (b) if M * is a linear iterate of M as in (a), then M * is coarsely iterable with respect to iteration trees which do not use the top extender of M * and its images. Then M is coarsely iterable.

What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.

Truth predicates are widely believed to be capable of serving a certain logical or quasi-logical function. There is little consensus, however, on the exact nature of this function. We offer a series of formal results in support of the thesis that disquotational truth is a device to simulate higher-order resources in a first-order setting. More specifically, we show that any theory formulated in a higher-order language can be naturally and conservatively interpreted in a first-order theory with a disquotational truth or (...) truth-of predicate. In the first part of the paper we focus on the relation between truth and full impredicative sentential quantification. The second part is devoted to the relation between truth-of and full impredicative predicate quantification. (shrink)

Ronald W Hepburn; Art, Truth and the Education of Subjectivity, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 185–198, https://doi.

Let L[E] be an iterable tame extender model. We analyze to which extent L[E] knows fragments of its own iteration strategy. Specifically, we prove that inside L[E], for every cardinal K which is not a limit of Woodin cardinals there is some cutpoint t K > a>ω1 are cardinals, then ◊$_{K.\lambda }^* $ holds true, and if in addition λ is regular, then ◊$_{K.\lambda }^* $ holds true.

The concept ‘nature’ and the role it has played in conservation philosophy have been criticized on theoretical and ethical grounds. Theoretical critiques include that it is ambiguous and implies a false human-nature dichotomy and/or human exceptionalism. Ethical critiques include that it has been used to justify unjust conservation practices, such as colonial erasure and displacing Indigenous and local peoples from their lands. More recently, the concept has been criticized on the grounds that under conditions of high rate and high magnitude (...) anthropogenic change it is not reliable for guiding effective conservation decision-making. Do these critiques imply theorists and practitioners ought to develop a conservation philosophy without ‘nature’? Drawing from work by Steve Vogel and Sally Haslanger, I advocate taking an ameliorative approach to ‘nature,’ rather than abandoning the concept altogether. ‘Nature’ is not an ontologically privileged category that has special moral or value properties, but sufficiently ameliorated, it nevertheless has a crucial role to play in the future of conservation philosophy. (shrink)

We show that L absoluteness for semi-proper forcings is equiconsistent with the existence of a remarkable cardinal, and hence by [6] with L absoluteness for proper forcings. By [7], L absoluteness for stationary set preserving forcings gives an inner model with a strong cardinal. By [3], the Bounded Semi-Proper Forcing Axiom is equiconsistent with the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom , which in turn is equiconsistent with a reflecting cardinal. We show that Bounded Martin's Maximum is much stronger than BSPFA in (...) that if BMM holds, then for every X ∈ V , X# exists. (shrink)

I have two aims: to analyze Jonathan Webber’s analysis of bad faith and compare it to my own, traditional, account and to show that Webber’s focus on character, as a set of dispositions or character traits that incline but do not determine us to view the world and behave in certain ways, contributes further to understanding Sartre’s ‘bad faith’. Most Sartre scholars have ignored any emphasis on ‘character’. What is distinctive and emphatic in Webber’s interpretation is his insistence ‘on bad (...) faith’ as a ‘social disease’ distorting the way one views, interprets, and even thinks about the world.. But, again, this pattern is not deterministic. Early in his work, Webber tells us that Sartre does not claim that we have bad faith by ‘ascribing character traits where there are none but by pretending to ourselves that we have ‘fixed natures’ that e.g. preclude the behaviour or character trait of which one is being accused.Though hardly disagreeing radically with Webber I do offer critical considerations. While Webber focuses on character, I focus on Sartre’s contention that the ‘most basic’ or ‘first act’ of bad faith is ‘to flee from what [the human being] cannot flee, from what it is’, specifically human freedom. And I disagree partially with Webber’s articulation of the ‘spirit of seriousness’, and strongly with both Sartre’s and his supporting claim that bad faith cannot be cynical. I also demur from Webber’s overemphasis on the ‘social’. For me, the root of all bad faith is our primitive ontological condition; namely, that at its very ‘upsurge’, human reality, anguished by its ‘reflective apprehension’ of its freedom and lack of Being, is disposed to flee from its nothingness in pursuit of identity, substantiality - in short, Being. (shrink)

This is the first volume on the subject of the alleviation of world suffering. At the same time it is also the first book framing the fields of global socio-economic development, world health, human rights, peace studies, sustainability, and poverty within the challenge of alleviating suffering and improving quality of life. Both international studies and global development have become specialized and fragmented, whereas this work assembles all of these development fragments together in order to determine whether common ground exists to (...) make headway in reducing global suffering. Leading experts in these various fields of development and suffering have been recruited worldwide to give scholarly assessments of the major human problems and how they can be successfully tackled. (shrink)

My contributions to the early issues of the "Journal of Religious Ethics" display the conviction that moral judgments and religious beliefs arise from complex but comprehensible operations of practical reasoning. As this conviction has continued to ground my explorations of diverse religious traditions as well as my consideration of challenges in the domain of bioethics, I have undertaken to develop a total and coherent logic of moral judgment. Much has changed, of course, in the past quarter century, and we have (...) all had to rethink the moral boundaries of human life. These changes have, however, confirmed rather than altered my sense of the importance of bringing into view the decisional basis of practical judgments--a base that is sometimes obscured by religious traditions as they reify earlier practical decisions and ignore their decisional basis. (shrink)

“What do historians mean by “the Enlightenment”, and is the term applicable to eighteenth-century England? It is the theme of this book that the great intellectual tradition associated with the Renaissance disintegrated in the eighteenth century under the impact of the scientific revolution and the thought of John Locke. In its place there grew up a new emphasis upon individualism, a new awareness of the class structure, and, especially in the novel, a new interest in the claims of the lower (...) classes upon society. The new philosophical tenets influenced the arts in different ways- literature for instance was more ready than architecture or painting to take the new ideas into account. Often aesthetic theory was at variance with practice. In the literature of the time the politics of the age received a jaundiced and bitter treatment. The great men of the age, Locke, Swift, Addison, Bolingbroke, Pope, Fielding, Richardson, Samuel Johnson, Gibbon, Hogarth, Reynolds, Gainsborough and the others, lived in a thought-world very different from our own, yet one from which our own has sprung. It is the purpose of this book to reconstruct that thought-world.” Publisher. (shrink)

Important revisions and additions to the contemporary objectives of acceptance rules result from construing a theory of warranted inductive inference to presuppose an account of adequate scientific explanations. We conceive the objects of acceptance rules to be the best of competing scientific explanations. Our primary interest is to show how to construct an analysis of competing explanations. Hence our specific investigation concerns the interrelations between the criteria of adequacy for scientific explanations and the definitions of the modes of competition between (...) explanations. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson's well-known model (...) and Franklin's x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the less well known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson's discovery. The insights into this groundbreaking historical episode will have consequences for the ‘new’ received view of scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]), rather than trying to put forth a ‘theory of models’, is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically driven view and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]) for the ‘autonomy’ of models in the construction process: models are determined neither by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson's model but rather the helical diffraction theory which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray diffraction pictures. In particular, Cartwright's take on (ii) is refuted by a comparison of Franklin's bottom-up approach with Crick and Watson's top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent. How to Get to the Structure 1.1 X-ray diffraction and its synthesis 1.2 Model building and Pauling's panache 1.3 The structure of proteins 1.3.1 A failed inference to the best explanation 1.3.2 The misleading 5.1 Å spot in proteins and how to get rid of it 1.3.3 Derived predictions from Pauling's alpha-helix of protein molecules The CCV Theory of Helical X-Ray Diffraction 2.1 The role of the CCV theory in the discovery of the DNA structure Killing the Helix 3.1 Appreciating all evidence—in vain Conclusion Epilogue: Chargaff's Ratios CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Generalizing Woodin’s extender algebra, cf. e.g. Steel Handbook of set theory, Springer, Berlin, 2010), we isolate the long extender algebra as a general version of Bukowský’s forcing, cf. Bukovský, in the presence of a supercompact cardinal.

Using the emerging technology of large-scale textual analysis, this study examines the use of the term ‘customer satisfaction’ and its variants in the annual reports issued by publicly traded U.S. corporations and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as Form 10-K. We document the frequency of the term’s occurrence in 10-Ks over the 1995–2013 period and the differences in usage across industries. We then relate the term’s usage in 10-Ks to subsequent scores from the American Customer Satisfaction Index to (...) determine whether management’s discussion of customer satisfaction in financial disclosures is credible. The commitment of management to shareholders versus, more broadly, stakeholders is a central question in business ethics, and the integrity of management communication is a fundamental construct in the American Marketing Association’s Statement of Ethics. We document a complex relation between management’s discussion of customer satisfaction and subsequently reported satisfaction. We find that the general use of customer satisfaction in 10-K documents is negatively correlated with subsequent ACSI scores. However, for retail firms, when the phrase is located near words indicating measurement or monitoring of the phenomenon, the empirical relation is reversed and becomes positive. (shrink)

The article is concerned with the everyday activities of sociology, focusing on ethnography. It argues that empirical study of the ethnomethods of ethnography allows for a deeper insight into the dynamics and procedures of this research practice. Based on empirical data from two ethnographic studies, I suggest to observe how such an investigation is conducted in various situations: in the field, on the ethnographer’s desk, in data sessions, in conferences and in written papers. This serves to gather and produce empirical (...) traces from the field. These are de- and re-contextualized while they are taken into the sociological field. This process can be analyzed drawing on Goffman’s notion of Frame Analysis, particularly drawing on his notion of keyings. Ethnography can thus be described as a trans-situational practice that systematically couples situations and communications in order to understand and reconstruct other social practices for sociological reasons. (shrink)

For a dialetheist, it is rational to believe that true contradictions exist. However, we argue that a dialetheist faces a complex dilemma given some bridge principles for rational beliefs that connect possibility and probability, including the so-called ‘Regularity Principle’. Either her belief is not doxastically possible even for her, or she must assign positive credence to the proposition that dialetheia exists. The former makes her belief prima facie self-defeating. The latter seems to compel her to choose between several more fine-grained (...) options, each of which seems undesirable for a regular and rational probability theory. It is unclear how a dialetheist would stay rationally regular, so we pose this challenge, seeking a response from a dialetheist. (shrink)